Halibut Hangar

Originally Published March 15, 2009; Updated and Republished May 16, 2009; Updated and Republished May 23, 2009; Updated and Republished June 10, 2009; Updated and Republished July 03, 2009:

Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Gary Roughhead recently (audio) touted the Navy's diversity policy and initiative—so what's the diversity on our 73 or so submarines1.

Easy question to ask—a bit more difficult to answer—fleet data are not available in the Navy's public Quarterly Series, Navy-Wide Demographic Data—a separate document or series could not be found for Navy demographics by fleet (ships, submarines etc.).

So we'll punt until better demographic data can be obtained for our submarine fleet. First, we can eliminate women, because even though they make up 15.22% of the total active duty Navy they are not permitted to serve as submarine line officers² or fill enlisted submarine billets⁵.

Active duty submarine warfare and special warfare unrestricted line officers are 89.2% White and 10.8% Non-White³. Non-White males make up 17% of the total active duty Navy officers—to no submariner's surprise Non-Whites are under represented on submarines.

But officers account for only a small portion of those serving on submarines—what to do about the enlisted? For this a "Hell Hail Mary Pass" is required! It turns out that a study⁴ of submariner's health complaints was conducted over 240 patrols. The study categorized the data by officer/enlisted (enlisted complained more) and White/Non-White—a pretty good proxy for a "Hell Hail Mary Pass".

Over the approximately three year period and 240 patrols the enlisted crews were composed of 88.1% Whites and 10.4% Non-Whites (1.6% unknown). Officer crews were 92.2% White and 5.7% Non-White (2.1% unknown).

The good news is the CNO has a diversity initiative—the bad news is he's around the 50-60 yard line for Non-White submarine diversity and not even on the field for submarine gender diversity.

Hopefully, the Navy Personnel Command will include a cut of their great Navy-Wide Demographics Data by submarine fleet and officer/enlisted, as a minimum.

Blog:

• UPDATED 05/23/2009 Reuters, President Address the Naval Academy Graduating Class of 2009. The class of 2009 graduated 84.9% (1036/1220).

  Based on the class of 2009 incoming profile the graduating class demographics are: Women(200); Blacks(58); Hispanic(97); Asian(34); Native American(24); Hawaiian(16). (Red = under represented compared to active duty fleet totals)

Web:

• UPDATED 07/03/2009 UPI, Naval Academy admits most diverse class.

  Closing any academic remedial gaps that may exist among the diverse class of cadets is a joint mission of high priority to be accomplished by the cadets, Academy, Navy, and our nation.

  Under no circumstances must these gaps be viewed as a reason or justification for lowering the Academy's commitment to achieve diversity, maintain its high graduating standards, and its tradition of delivering highly competent Naval officers to our fleet in the service of our nation.

• UPDATED 05/16/2009 CNO testifies before House Armed Services Subcommittee on May 14, 2009.

  "We have had great success in increasing our diversity outreach and improving diversity accessions in our ranks. We are committed to a Navy that reflects the diversity of the nation in all specialties and ranks by 2037. Through our outreach efforts, we have observed an increase in NROTC applications and have increased diverse NROTC scholarship offers by 28 percent. The NROTC class of 2012 is the most diverse class in history and, with your help through nominations, the U.S. Naval Academy class of 2012 is the Academy’s most diverse class in history. Our Navy is engaging diversity affinity groups such as the National Society of Black Engineers, Thurgood Marshall College Fund, Society of Hispanic Professional Engineers, American Indian Science and Engineering Society, Mexican American Engineering Society, and the Asian Pacific Islander American Scholarship Fund to increase awareness of the opportunities for service in the Navy. Our engagement includes Flag attendance, junior officer participation, recruiting assets such as the Blue Angels, direct Fleet interaction. We have also established Regional Outreach Coordinators in Atlanta, Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, and Miami to build Navy awareness in diverse markets.

  As we continue to meet the challenges of a new generation, the Navy is already being recognized for our efforts through receipt of the Work Life Legacy Award (Families and Work Institute), the Work Life Excellence Award (Working Mother Media), Most Admired Employer (U.S. Black Engineer and Hispanic Engineer Magazine), and Best Diversity Company (Diversity/Careers in Engineering and IT)."--CNO Admiral Gary Roughead, May 14, 2009--

  Kudos to the Navy and CNO on their outreach efforts—no easy task to meet recruiting goals while ensuring fleet and command diversity.

• CNO Releases Diversity Podcast
• Navy Personnel Command Diversity

-----notes-----

1. United States submarine force structure as of September 2008 is 55 SSN: 28 ComSubLant; 27 ComSubPac; AND 14 SSBN: 6 ComSubLant, 8 ComSubPac AND 4 SSGN: 2 ComSubLant; 2 ComSubPac.

The current SSN ratio of Atlantic to Pacific may change as submarines are moved to the Pacific, Los Angles-class submarines are decommissioned, and Virginia-class submarines are commissioned.

2. Submarine Warfare group designators 112x/117x and submarine special warfare group designators 113x/118x are currently restricted inaccessible to women.

Navy wide active duty flag officer (one to five star admirals) women represent 6.8%—one of the flag officer women is black—well under represented in the Navy leadership hierarchy.

3. An officer may possess a designator of "unrestricted line officer" in submarine warfare or submarine special warfare and not serve on submarines. Stated differently just because an officer is qualified to serve and command submarines does not mean he does.

At the active duty flag officer level (one to five star admirals) Whites are 94.4% and Non-Whites 5.6%. Blacks represent 4.7% at this leadership level while representing 18.8% of the total active Navy.

The first black four star admiral, J Paul Reason (Ret.), was appoint in 1996.

4. Terry L. Thomas et al., "Health of U.S. Navy Submarine Crew During Periods of Isolation". Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, Vol. 74, No. 3, March 2003

As an aside on average submariners were 89% non-smokers, probably a higher percentage today?

5. UPDATED 03/16/2009 It is difficult to imagine what job a woman could not do well on our modern submarines. Women are masters of patient strategic thinking and would out perform their male peers in many submarine job classifications.

If a respected woman war attack officer (aka OOD) said come right to course xxx prepare to fire torpedoes the only reply from crew members would be "come right to course xxx, prepare to fire torpedoes, aye"—steering course xxx, prepared to fire torpedoes". If she is not respected she will be immediately transferred from the submarine and perhaps the Navy.

The discussions beginning around 1994 about space, privacy, "hotbunking" etc. are mostly red herrings. If the challenges (and there are many) of submarines appeal to a woman she should be welcomed, mentored, and treated just like any other submariner.

Yes, some submariners periodically "hotbunk" for certain missions or while conducting some testing—the overwhelming number of submariners never "hotbunk". The number of women volunteering for submarine duty will likely be so small this would never be an issue.

Those applying the paternalistic logic of protecting women from some ribald submariners need to update their logic—some women can be and are just as ribald as their counter-part. Yes, some women may implement their personal female sensibilities (e.g. dart or tailor their "poopy suit"), but how does this harm or impact mission readiness or performance. Some women could care less and are just as comfortable crawling around bilges as their male counter-part (on submarines appearance is rarely, if ever confused with respect for capability and talent).

Submarine privacy comes from others focusing on their job and personal hobbies when not performing their job, standing watch, or sleeping. The idea that submariners (officer or enlisted) will uncontrollably seek to join the "mile low club" is ridicules. Submariners are some of the most talented and disciplined (and yes ribald) naval personnel. Yes, their will be on board and off board sexual incidents, but these can be routinely dealt with as any other disciplinary matter.

Originally Published June 02, 2009; Updated and Republished June 15, 2009; Updated and Republished June 27, 2009; Updated and Republished July 02, 2009:

United States Navy joins the search for Air France flight 447—a debris field has been located—estimated maximum water depth is two miles; sea floor topology very rugged.

Web:

• UPDATED 07/02/2009 BBC, Piecing together fate of Air France jet. Excluding a failure of the "black box" beacon itself (i.e. no acoustic signal), it seems incredible that searchers cannot localize its acoustic signal.

• UPDATED 06/27/2009 Scotsman, Search for passengers of Flight 447 ends, race for black boxes goes on.

  Earlier reports (6-15 hours) that the flight data recorder (FDR or black box) had been located proved over optimistic—searcher are investigating a sound but are not able to confirm it is the FDR beacon from the.

  A typical FAA approved pinger or beacon attached to the FDR will send out a continuous acoustic 160.5dB, 9ms pulse at 37.5 kHz for a minimum of 30 days, usually up to 90 days or longer at a slightly reduced dB level.¹

  By comparison a dolphin's sonar might click (ping) around 170dB whereas a modern submarine might ping² at a much higher level of 210 - 220dB.

  Every 10 dB increase is like turning up the volume by a power of ten (10, 100, 1,000...)!

  Submariners know that sound travels about four times faster in seawater than air (say 1480 m/sec versus 340 m/sec, respectively). In seawater sound speed decreases for about the first 1,000 meters then increases linearly with water depth.

• UPDATED 06/15/2009 UPI, Investigators: No explosion on Flight 447.
• UPDATED 06/06/2009 Times of India, France sends nuclear sub to help find missing plane. The submarine Émeraude S 604.
• UPDATED 06/04/2009 Time, Could a Computer Glitch Have Brought Down Air France 447?.

• BBC, Lost jet data 'may not be found'. France sends two deep diving submersibles (perhaps both are Nautiles) to support recovery efforts.

  Contrary to current news accounts it’s very likely larger debris items will be examined—if these items (or other information) are indicative of a bomb, debris will be recovered.

• Reuters, FACTBOX: Facts and speculation surrounding Air France crash

Video:

• AP, Brazil Confirms Air France Jet Crashed in Ocean:
• Reuters, Air France searchers find debris

Wikipedia: UPDATED 06/06/2009 Air France Flight 447

-----notes-----

1. Based on the Teledyne Benthos TSO-C121 FAA approved pinger.

2. A submarine sonar operator might compare the difficulty of searching for the "black box" to randomly detecting and characterizing a very noisy (160dB) and stationary submarine using a single relatively fast attenuating high frequency (37.5 kHz) tonal.

Now imagine a submarine sonar operator's job if the "black box" were very quiet (100-110 dB), non-stationary, evasive, emitting multiple tonals within a wider frequency spectrum (1Hz - 20kHz) and maybe using counter-measures like decoy tonals, noise generators etc.).

As correctly operated modern submarines approach the practical limits (technical and cost) of very quiet even the most skilled sonar technician, aided by neural network software, and massive computing power will have an increasingly difficult job.

Thankfully, we can leave the experts to openly debate the nonproliferation implications. A future where nations' undetectable and undeterrable ballistic missile submarines are silently driving into each other gives new meaning to the term "silent service". Perhaps there are better alternatives?

Interesting Strategy Page article on littoral use of standoff torpedoes.

Res:

• UPDATED June 30, 2009 Probability Of Kill For VLA ASROC Torpedo Launch.

  Here is an interesting thesis on a first order passive approximation aid for localization and effectiveness—getting the standoff torpedo where you think the submarine is going.

  Of course, as the Strategy Page article implies there is no reason why a ship platform is required to detect, characterize, and localize the submarine—other network centric sonar (passive or active) or laser based platforms (nodes) will do just fine.

The tenth biannual International Submarine Races end without setting a new speed record—the absolute speed record of 8.035 knots set by Quebec's Omer Five two seat, propeller driven submarine (ninth biannual races) remains intact. The races are held at the David Taylor Model Basin (DTMB) and are sponsored by NavSea, General Dynamics, The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Oceanic Engineering Society.

Scubadoo at DTMB

Web:

• UPDATED 07/02/2009 USA, Students design, build, race pedal-powered submarines.
• International Submarine Races

Originally Published May 08, 2009; Updated and Republished May 15, 2009; Updated and Republished May 18, 2009; Updated and Republished May 26, 2009; Updated and Republished June 06, 2009; Updated and Republished June 12, 2009; Updated and Republished June 27, 2009:

The president has submitted his budget for FY 2010. The Navy Shipbuilding and Conversion portion of the FY 2010 Defense budget proposes $2,107,040,000 for one Virginia-class submarine2 (VCS) and $1,395,548,000 for advance procurement.

USS Virginia SSN 774

A VCS without crew or weapons currently costs a mind-boggling and eye-popping $2.8 billion dollars¹. The current average cost of a VCS is significantly more than $2.8 billion (assuming the $6.2 billion non-recurring design costs are not reflected in the $2.8 billion).

Even if the Navy and contractors meet the often parroted $2 billion¹ target the average cost for delivering a VCS will likely not drop below $3 billion dollars and will most likely rise (see On FPI Contracting And The Virginia Class Submarine).

• Manufacturers: General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman
• Displacement (tons): submerged - 7,800; surface - 7,300 (est)
• Length: (feet/meter): 377/114.9
• Beam: (feet/meter): 34/10.3
• Speed (knots/mph/kph): submerged – 34/39.1/62.9; surface – 14/16.1/25.9
• Propulsion: single shaft, pump-jet, 44,000 shp
• Power plant: S9G, advanced breeder
• Dive Depth (feet/meter): 1,600/487.6
• Torpedo Tubes: 4; 21”
• Armaments: Mark 48 Torpedo (heavy); Block IV Cruise and Harpoon Missile; Mark 67 SLMM; littoral mining
• Standard Crew Complement: 134 men (no women, yet)

Web:

• UPDATED 06/27/2009 NavyMil, Virginia-class Submarines Receive the Highest Ranking of Operational Test Agency.

  The Navy is reporting that Operational Test and Evaluation Force (COMOPTEVFOR) have submitted its final report for the Virginia-class submarine (VCS) to the CNO.

  The Navy article states that COMOPTEVFOR has judged the VCS "operationally effective" and "operationally suitable" but does not provide the report. Hopefully the CNO will release the COMOPTEVFOR report soon.

  It's a little curious that the VCS is currently getting an entire new front-end. The new front-end includes an entirely different sonar from the sonar on the VCS used by COMOPTEVFOR to judged the VCS "operationally effective" and "operationally suitable".

  It seems useful to test, evaluate, and certify the submarine and submarine sonar that will be produced—not a prototype submarine with a completely different sonar.

  Also, it will be interesting to read and understand how COMOPTEVFOR handled the testing of the VCS shock requirements. This is extremely important as so much of the VCS mission critical hardware is COTS.

• UPDATED 06/12/2009 The Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee (SEFS) Markup H.R. 2647, FY10. The markup includes $2.8 billion for one VCS.

  Unsurprisingly, the subcommittee chairman and co-chair of the shipbuilding caucus, Gene Taylor expressed support for Navy's "vision" (dream?) of building 48 VCS.

  “This mark clearly sets the subcommittees vision for the future, that vision is a Fleet of at least 313 ships. That Fleet will have a high/low mix with our aircraft carriers and nuclear cruisers at the high end, over 90 DDG 51 destroyers, at least 48 Virginia class submarines, and at least 55 Littoral Combat Ships."--Representative Gene Taylor (MS-D)--

  Unfortunately congressman Taylor did not inform us why our Navy needs 48 VCS or what it plans on doing with them beyond incurring and accumulating enormous purchase, operation, maintenance, and disposal costs (hopefully others are challenging the costs and need for purchasing, operating, maintaining, and disposing of 11 carrier battle groups)?!

  It appears the Navy and its patrons have not yet received the change memo?!

  • Full Statement of SEFS Chairman Gene Taylor

• UPDATED 06/06/2009 CNO testifies before House Appropriation Subcommittee for Defense on June 02, 2009.

  The CNO repeats his Armed Service testimony before the defense subcommittee—this time with the new Secretary of Navy in tow.

  It's amazing how little justification is required by congress before funding these exorbitant weapon systems—we're forward deployed worldwide, our core capability is sea control, or as long as clubs exist we must have the biggest one is not justification!

• UPDATED 05/28/2009 Naval Institute Proceedings Magazine, Fear and Loathing in the Post-Naval Era. Interesting article by prolific WWII naval writer Barrett Tillman in Naval Institute Proceedings:

  "Since the United States has not fought a real naval battle since World War II, justifying the high cost of a large Fleet of warships and aircraft is a tall order...Why do we have such a big Navy when we hardly ever use it?...What do we get for the hundreds of billions of dollars we pay for having a Navy and Marine Corps?...The question for naval professionals and their supporters therefore becomes: How do we justify a large blue-water Navy that has not fought a war at sea in three generations?"--Barrett Tillman--

  Our exorbitantly priced VCS submarines are basically Cold War platforms in search of a 21^st century mission, according to Tillman.

  • NPR Interview with Tillman, Why Do We Need The U.S. Navy? (8M mp3)
• UPDATED 05/26/2009 Thomas, Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. President signed the legislation on May 22, 2009.

• UPDATED 05/18/2009 Joint Chiefs Chairman, Admiral Michael G. Mullen testifies before Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) on May 14, 2009.

  Admiral Mullen confirmed the CNO's HASC⁸ testimony that the FY 2010 purchases one VCS. Although the admiral did not specify whether is was the 11^th or 12^th or explicitly refer to it as a VCS:

  "I fully support not only the President’s fiscal year 2010 budget submission for this department, but more specifically, the manner in which Secretary Gates developed it...It fully funds the Joint Strike Fighter and F–18 Superhornet programs, buys another Arleigh Burke destroyer, a nuclear submarine, and a third DDG–1000. ..."--Admiral Mullen before SASC on May 14, 2009--

  (Archived Webcast Gates and Mullen, May 14, 2009)

• UPDATED 05/15/2009 CNO testifies before House Armed Services Subcommittee (HASC) on May 14, 2009.

  "...Specifically, our FY 2010 budget funds eight ships: the 12th Virginia class submarine³, three Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), two T-AKE Dry Cargo and Ammunition Ships, a second Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) for the Navy, and an advanced Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer...The VIRGINIA Class submarine is a multi-mission submarine that dominates in the littorals and open oceans. Now in its 10th year of construction, the VIRGINIA program is demonstrating that this critical undersea capability can be delivered affordably and on time. We have aggressively reduced construction costs of the VIRGINIA Class to $2 billion per submarine, as measured in FY 2005 dollars, through construction performance improvements, redesign for affordability, and a multi-year procurement contract, which provides an assured build rate for shipyards⁴ and vendors and offers incentives for cost⁵, schedule⁶, and capital expenditure for facility improvements⁷. Not only are these submarines coming in within budget and ahead of schedule, their performance is exceeding expectations and continues to improve with each ship delivered. I consider Virginia Class cost reduction efforts a model for all our ships, submarines, and aircraft."--CNO Admiral Gary Roughead, May 14, 2009--

  Hearings are ongoing and others have testified before and after the CNO...more later.

-----notes-----

1. The FY 2009 (see Virginia Class Submarine - Defense Authorization FY09) budget paid the advance procurement for the FY 2010 VCS. To get the total cost of $2.8 billion you add last year advance procurement to the above $2.1 billion dollars.

After purchasing the VCS for $2.8 billion our Navy's ownership costs include: crew costs; weapons costs; operating costs; maintenance costs; upgrade costs; retrofit costs;—for thirty too forty years! Then at the end of 30-40 years the Navy must pay for: defueling and storage of the submarine's radioactive reactor compartment, forever; reprocessing spent fuel rods; and scrapping the submarine (there is a very small offset for the scrap value of the non-radioactive HY-100 steel and miscellaneous submarine metal).

The Navy and contractors perpetually and understandably refer to their unrealized goal of reducing the cost of a VCS too $2 billion dollars and never talk about the staggering total cost of owning and operating one VCS, much less 11, 21, 36, 50 or more!

However, without public release of more supporting data it's virtually impossible to accurately evaluate the assumptions and conditions corresponding with the often parroted $2 billion dollar goal, notwithstanding issuance of the Block III FPI contract (see On FPI Contracting And The Virginia Class Submarine). Much less the total cost of ownership for a single VCS—our Navy must make public these data.

2. UPDATED 05/08/2009 Those using a $4.182B figure are likely referring to a DoD document Program Acquisition Costs by Weapon System, DoD FY 2010 Budget Request Summary Justification, May 2009.

Additionally, some may be relying on non-public personal discussions with Connecticut's Second Congressional District Representative Joe Courtney (and others), understandably a strong proponent for the costly two contractors, two VCS per year production rate configuration.

3. It's unclear what funds the 11^th VCS, the first of the Block III FPI VCS if 2010 only funds the 12^th VCS? The CNO enumerates eight ships, including one VCS, the 12^th in the submarine class.

4. The CNO is obliquely tying the unrealized $2 billion dollar price target to a two contractor, two VCS per year production rate. The follow-up question is what happens to the unrealized $2 billion dollar target price if there is one contractor and one submarine per year production rate?

5. The CNO is referring to the Fixed Price Incentive contract which awards additional profit for meeting negotiated incentives—the awards are significant, particularly if they are "front-loaded" (see also On FPI Contracting And The Virginia Class Submarine).

6. The CNO is obliquely referring to another significant assumption tied to the unrealized $2 billion dollar price target—that the schedule will be compressed in order to eliminate the overhead (G&A) and level-of-effort costs, primarily program management.

7. It's unclear whether the CNO is referring to direct reimbursement of the contractor for capital expenditures on capital improvements or indirectly via incremental profits for capital expenditures via the cost of capital calculations or both direct and indirect reimbursement for capital expenditures on capital improvements?

This is not trivial as capital expenditures for submarine programs are enormous—double enormous when you plan on reimbursing two contractors for two sets of identical capital improvements so you can produce two submarines per year.

8. An online post by the Norwich Bulletin, Pentagon praises effectiveness of 'extraordinary' subs dated May 17, 2009 indicates that the CNO appeared before the HASC, Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee on May 14, 2009—the Hangar has been unable to locate that testimony, if it exists.

The post also quotes Representative Courtney as saying "he [Courtney] and the Pentagon are on the same page regarding the submarine funding in Fiscal Year 2010"—a page that both the CNO and Joint Chief chairman think includes one VCS.

Evidently, Representative Courtney believes that the page includes different funding with respect to the VCS (not SBSD funding, $495 million)—hopefully he will make public the basis of this belief.

Originally Published March 10, 2009; Updated and Republished March 11, 2009; Updated and Republished March 12, 2009; Updated and Republished March 20, 2009; Updated and Republished June 15, 2009; Updated and Republished June 23, 2009:

United States maritime surveillance ship USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS 23)¹ was harassed by a handful of smaller Chinese ships while openly conducting operations in the South China Sea, approximately 75 nautical miles south of Hainan Island, China (aerial map). Operations were well outside China's 12 mile territorial waters as defined by United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

The harassment is more indicative of pirates' behavior than what is expect from a professional PLA Navy and its sailors—at one point the Chinese ships blocked passage and pretended to ram (“playing chicken”) the USNS Impeccable. The Chinese ship came within 75 25 yards feet³ of the USNS Impeccable, which responded by spraying the ships with its fire hoses.

This is not the first time² China has wrongfully asserted its territorial 12 mile rights within its 200 mile economic rights zone—within 12 mile the “right of transit” does not include surveillance and mapping rights—outside 12 miles the "right of transit" does include surveillance and mapping rights.

In addition to the formal protest, these unnecessary provocations can be put on the agenda of the recently restarted China-American military-military talks and working group.

Web:

UPDATED 06/24/2009 China Daily, Disputes at sea float to surface Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Michele Flournoy and delegation head to China for two-day routine confidence building military talks (10th Defense Consultative Talks). South China Sea, Korean Peninsula, Proliferation, and Pirates are likely to be among the agenda items.

• UPDATED 06/23/2009 BBC, China and US hold military talks.

• UPDATED 06/15/2009 Reuters, China sub collides with array towed by U.S. ship: report. U.S. gets ASW practice—China gets ASW counter-measure practice—a U.S. towed hydrophone array is lost in the process⁵.

  
  USGS Atlas Bathymetry - South China Sea⁴

  Wonder if these ASW encounters can be structured as joint exercises and thereby reduce the probability of future accidents⁵?

  • ChinaDaily, Sub, sonar collision 'inadvertent'

• UPDATED 05/07/2009 UPI, Chinese fishing vessels confront US ship.

  China and U.S. have agreed to disagree on what activity is permitted by convention in a nation's economic zone as opposed to its 12 limit. Each continuing to make their point in non-harmful or non-threatening ways (if somewhat lacking in professional seamanship).

  Significantly, the USS Victorious (a sibling of the Impeccable) was unaccompanied by any American warships and radioed to Chinese ships for help in warding off its two harassing vessels—both vessels left shortly after the radio call for help.

• UPDATED 03/20/2009 UPI, China ready to end standoff with U.S.. China-U.S. decide to focus on more cooperative matters and end the aggressive posturing—Yes!, 是的, shide
  • China Daily, Sino-US sea standoff appears to have ended
• UPDATED 03/14/2009 BBC, Who's right in South China Sea spat?.
• UPDATED 03/13/2009 UPI, Chinese criticize dispatch of destroyer.

• UPDATED 03/13/2009 StraitsTimes, Destroyers to escort US ships.

  United States destroyers will escort unarmed surveillance ships to ensure they are not harassed outside China's territorial space—first to ride shotgun is the Burke-class destroyer Crew & Family Website, USS Chung-Hoon (DDG-93) and NavSource, USS Chung-Hoon (DDG-93).

  

• UPDATED 03/12/2009 Reuters, Obama, China's Yang discuss global economic crisis and recent Impeccable incident.

  "The President also stressed the importance of raising the level and frequency of the U.S.- China military-to-military dialogue in order to avoid future incidents."--White House Blog, The President meets with Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi--

• UPDATED 03/12/2009 TaipeiTimes, Taiwan ‘driving Chinese military goals’. Certainly China is obsessed with Taiwan, but that begs the question, why?

  China likely feels "contained" and views Taiwan and their Texas size definition of sovereignty (China would like to define everything within the first island chain as sovereign China, not just the South China Sea.) as necessary to mitigate those feelings.

  The question keeping Admiral Keating up at night is whether China intends to impose their definition of sovereignty by force or consensus. The question keeping China up at night is how much it can provoke the United States without generating an all out China containment response—a disaster for both countries, but especially for China.

  In this context China's military opaqueness will increase distrust and surveillance missions. Transparency and candidness are keys to our mutually beneficial, and respectful partnership.

  Without transparency, candidness, and trust a mutually beneficial and respectful partnership is impossible—Keating will continue trying to figure out how many SSNs and SSBNs he has to sink should China miscalculate how much it can provoke the United States.

  Cute statements analogies about thiefs outside your bamboo fence are unlikely to be interpreted as transparency, candidness or trust.

• UPDATED 03/12/2009 WorldSocialist, Naval incidents highlight tense US-China relations.
• UPDATED 03/11/2009 Reuters, Obama to raise ships incident with China.

• UPDATED 03/11/2009 Xinhua/ChinaDaily, China lodges representation as U.S. naval ship breaks int'l, Chinese laws.

  • Xinhua/ChinaDaily, Defense Ministry urges U.S. to respect China's security concern.

• UPDATED 03/11/2009 BBC, US-China talks as sea row rumbles.

  Much of this can be attributed to China's inexperience relating to other nations—it's classic China to define sovereignty like Texans—then become offended when others ignore their Texas size definition of sovereignty.

  It seems beneficial that China has begun partnering and interacting with other nations, particularly us—its preference and tendency favors withdrawal behind walls where sovereignty and interaction can be strictly regulated, controlled, and limited.

  It also seems likely that there will be more periodic, inept, abrasiveness events as China figures out the quality and quantity of its global interaction—taking shots at responsible power nations is fun until you're a responsible power nation (then you squirt water with fire hoses instead of conducting oppressive campaigns and massacres).

  Ironically, a responsible power nation quickly learns just how little sovereignty they have—unless you define sovereignty as mess management and paying for the cost of mismanaged mess clean-up!

• UPDATED 03/10/2009 SFGate, Officials: US ship in China spat was hunting subs.
• UPDATED 03/10/2009 NPR, China Says U.S. Ship Was Operating Illegally.

• UPDATED 03/10/2009 Reuters, U.S.-China spat complicates minister's visit.

  National Intelligence Director Dennis Blair told the U.S. Congress the Chinese have become more assertive in staking claims to international waters around economic zones and were "more military, aggressive, forward-looking than we saw a couple years before" in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea.

  Blair said it was unclear whether Beijing would use its growing military power "for good or pushing people around."--Reuters quoting Blair--

• UPDATED 03/10/2009 NYT, China Says U.S. Provoked Naval Incident. This is similar to the general allegations and hand waving China made about the September 27, 2002 incident.
• UPDATED 03/10/2009 Reuters, China says US navy ship was breaking law-HK website.
• China Draws U.S. Protest Over Shadowing of Ships
• VOA, Chinese Vessels Harass US Ships in International Waters

Blog:

• UPDATED 03/10/2009 FAS Secrecy News, US, China, and Incidents at Sea. Focusing on agreements to prevent such maritime incidents from occurring.
• UPDATED 03/10/2009 FAS Strategic Security, US-Chinese Anti-Submarine Cat and Mouse Game in South China Sea.

-----notes-----

1. The USNS Impeccable is one of five non-military surveillance and mapping ships from the United States Military Sealift Command’s 25 ships Special Ships Program. It’s general characteristics are: displacement: - 5,368 long tons; length - 281.5 feet; beam - 95.8 feet; draft - 26 feet; speed- 12.0 knots; Crew 25 civilian mariners.

The purpose of the surveillance is likely to aid in regional littoral submarine and anti-submarine warfare should war occur between China and the United States or a regional ally.

Fortunately, China and United States are currently increasing their dialogue and searching for ways to increase military transparency and engage in confidence building cooperation.

2. On March 24, 2001, in the Yellow Sea near South Korea, a PLA Navy Jianghu III-class frigate passed as close as 100 yards to a U.S. surveillance ship, the USNS Bowditch, and a PLA reconnaissance plane shadowed it. (CRS Report RL32496, FAS Website, U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress, Updated February 2008)

On September 27, 2002 China complained again about the non-military surveillance ship USNS Bowditch (T-AGS 62) mapping the Yellow Sea littorals (NYT, China Complains About U.S. Surveillance Ship

The South China Sea is a “sensitive area” primarily because of its potential for natural resources (gas and oil), long running disputes over territorial rights claims to some of the many islands (see Reuters, FACTBOX-South China Sea's disputed maritime borders), Taiwan’s independence, and its submarine base located inside Hainan Island.

The Yellow Sea is a "sensitive area" primarily because of ship building, including submarines, submarine base and the potential for using the Yellow Sea as a submarine bastion for China's ballistic missile submarines (SSBN).

3. Both the NYT and Reuters are now reporting 25 feet not yards.

4. Acoustically this is a very challenging environment requiring a significant amount of surveying, mapping, and modeling to understand.

5. It's likely not an accident that China is interfering with surveying and mapping by destroying the towed acoustical array. China’s efforts to interfere with transparent surveying and mapping of international waters seem counter productive, unnecessarily confrontational, irresponsible, unprofessional, and potentially fatal to both the submarine and submariners.

A Philadelphia Veterans Administration (VA) hospital "doctor", Gary Kao, was able to incorrectly perform prostate radiation seed implantation a whopping 82 percent¹ of the time—what the fuck, over!

Is there any review or oversight at Philadelphia's VA hospital, over...this is not a routine, regular, or typical SNAFU that occasionally occur at some VA hospitals...this is criminal negligence!

Blog:

• UPDATED 06/22/2009 NYT, Radiation Treatment: Tell Us Your Stories.

Web:

• UPDATED 06/23/2009 UPI, VA cancer treatment causes more injury.

• UPI, Report: VA errors caused radiation burns not to mention irradiating healthy cells.

  This is like repeatedly x-raying (pellets continually irradiate surrounding cells) the head to diagnosis a toe fracture!

-----notes-----

1. Performing 92 of 112 radioactive pellet implants incorrectly—isn't chance 50/50!

Fathers' Day 2009 in support of Iranians struggling for change—especially for the father whose daughter¹ was so brutally and senselessly murdered as she stood at his side.

-----notes-----

1. Internet and media outlets are referring to the young Iranian girl as 16 year-old Neda.

Updated reports indicate Neda is in her late 20s and was with her music instructor not her father. Facts, which make her murder no less traumatic, brutal, or senseless.

(Modern, but pre-Seawolf-SSN-21 US Dolphin Insignia)

See also Category:Halibut Submarine Terminology

If you have a submarine term you want defined or you have defined a submarine term you want included send it along as a comment.

• A
• Anchor: tbd

• Anchors Aweigh: The original 1906 unofficial theme song of the United States Navy (Wikipedia), composed by Charles A. Zimmerman. The song has been revised over the years.

  The term "anchors aweigh" is more applicable to surface ships than submarines, where it has a definite meaning of raising the anchor. It is equivalent to declaring, on the Halibut, "Captain, Halibut is underway", meaning the last mooring line has been removed and the nuclear reactor (Westinghouse SG3) is providing Halibut's propulsion.

  On the Halibut it was quite common to have "anchor pools" where players contributed a small sum of money (usually $5 or $10) to a pot. The contribution entitled you to select a grid square which corresponded to a definite time, but which was not revealed until after the quartermaster logged the official "docking time". The time closest to the official time won the pot of money.

  Some "anchor pools" where for considerably larger sums of money, but these where always "discretely" run - like a 1920s prohibition operation you had to be in the know to participate - these large sum "anchor pools" were "discouraged".

  The Navy's theme song it was regularly played during Halibut's ceremonies and formal events.

• Anchors, Mushroom: Halibut had two large mushroom anchors (the anchors look like upside down mushrooms) which it used to anchor over a seabed target, winch itself onto the seabed, and secure itself to the seabed.

  Sea currents, sea turbulence, submarine atmosphere, and equipment malfunctions, made getting to the seabed and staying there challenging.

  If the stresses and loads on the anchor or cable caused an anchor to separate from the submarine, as sometimes happened, Halibut headed home for repairs and extensive failure analysis.

  Anchoring is primarily a function of the anchor's ability to "penetrate" the seabed and the seabed's ability to "hold" the anchor once penetrated.

  Seabed "penetration" and "holding" is primarily a function of anchor size, shape and weight, given seabed composition and sea characteristics.

  A mushroom shaped anchor is used when the seabed is primarily muddy. The weight of the mushroom anchor determines the degree to which it penetrates the muddy seabed. The goal is a fully buried mushroom anchor because its "holding" properties are the greatest (more than 5 times greater for a given anchor size and weight).

  Question: Like getting your shoe and foot buried up to your ankle in mud - the "suction" of the mud makes it very hard to lift your foot. The mud may even "hold" your shoe after you are able to free your foot from the mud. Because of the size, shape, and surface area of a mushroom anchor the mud "holds" it much stronger than your shoe and foot. If you are in high school see if you can calculate the surface area and weight of half a steel, iron, or lead sphere 7 feet in diameter. Assume a cubic foot of each metal weighs 487, 480, and 710 lbs, respectively. If a mushroom anchor that is completely buried in mud can "hold" 5 times its weight what is the effective "holding" tonnage for each (steel, iron, and lead) mushroom anchor? Would your answers change if each mushroom anchor was not solid, but partially hollow?

  Question: Early Halibut operations anchored, but did not winch down onto the seabed. Why would Halibut change to winching onto and sitting on the seabed? If the “holding” property of the mushroom anchor is greater than the "cable strength" attached to the anchor what happens to the cable when Halibut tries to winch in the anchor? When Halibut was anchored over a target was submarine buoyancy negative, neutral, or positive? When Halibut was winching down toward the seabed was submarine buoyancy negative, neutral, or positive? When Halibut was sitting on the seabed, with her mushroom anchors buried in the muddy seabed was submarine buoyancy negative, neutral, or positive?

  Question: When Halibut deanchored from the seabed was submarine buoyancy negative, neutral, or positive?

• Anchoring Operation, Halibut: Anchoring Operation

• Antenna, AN/BRA-34: A primary mast antenna used for communications and navigation (satellite GPS)—replaced by the newer universal modular mast (UMM) OE-538/BRC.

  The OE-538/BRC can receive (Rx) over the broad spectrum of very low frequency (VLF) to ultra high frequency (UHF). It can transmit (Tx) over high frequency (HF) to ultra high frequency (UHF), including very high frequencies (VHF) used by special forces.

  The OE-538/BRC incorporates identification friend or foe (IFF) and demand assigned multiple access (DAMA) both critical for effective network centric warfare.
  
  See also Spectrum, Submarine Communications for definition for range of category frequencies (ELF, VLF, HF etc.)

• Antenna, HDR (OE-562/BRC): High Data Rate (HDR) submarine antenna is a pizza size (16^" dish antenna covered by a dome. It provides high data rate (HDR) satellite communication at extremely high and super high frequencies.

  It also supports the Global Broadcast Service (GBS) enabling the submarine to access military network and Internet digital data.

  The HDR antenna is a key component in the Navy's evolving vision of ubiquitous network centric platform communications. The Phased Array Antenna may eventually replace the HDR antenna.

  See Wikipedia, Joint Electronics Type Designation System for explanation of electronic equipment and component naming nomenclature (e.g. OE-562/BRC).

• Aquarium, Halibut: This is a nickname given to the sea-lock, located in the lower hangar, used to transfer hardware through Halibut's pressure hull while at sea. The sea-lock had a diameter of about 46 inches and consisted of three hatches, an inner, middle, and outer. Most often the transferred hardware consisted of towed search vehicles, remotely operated vehicles, signal recording pods, and items recovered or requested by deployed divers.
• Anchor Pool: see Anchors Aweigh.
• Anechoic Tiles or Coating: Tiles or coating applied to a submarine's outer hull which aids in sound absorption, echo distortion, and improved hydrodynamics, attributes enhancing a submarine's stealth characteristics.

• Artificial Sea Water: This is "designer water" intended to simulate the chemical composition of a particular ocean's environment, generally used in controlled simulation and testing. Salt is one significant component of most seawater. Sometimes this is referred to as ocean, salinity, but salinity refers to more than salt. a typical salinity can range from 30 to 37 grams per kilogram of seawater. Salinity - Sea of Okhotsk and hydro chemical atlas - sea of Okhotsk

  Other seawater chemicals are: chlorine,Cl; sodium, Na;magnesium, Mg; sulphur, S; calcium, Ca; potassium, K; bromine, Br; carbon, C; nitrogen, N; strontium, Sr 8; oxygen, O; boron, B; silicon, Si; fluorine, F; argon, Ar; lithium, Li; rubidium, Rb; phosphorus, P; ... for a complete list see: Ocean Chemistry and Deep Sea Sediments

  Can you think how this salt might affect the submarine's buoyancy? (hint: Does the density of the water increase or decrease when you add salt? Assume sea water has an average specific gravity of 1.0218).

  Scenario: You are officer of the deck supervising the diving office's manual control of the submarine's depth. The submarine sensors indicate you are about to enter an area of increased salinity (see thermohaline ). Would you tell the chief of the watch (cow) to pump water out of, or into the submarine, why?

  Question: Assume the cow tells you the water pump just blew out! While listening to the cow immediately call the "on watch" electrician mate, could you direct the diving officer to increase/decrease the submarine's speed and achieve the same result as pumping water into or out of the submarine?increase/decrease/why?

  Question: Do factors such as ocean temperature, ocean currents, ocean bathymetry (depth) [Sea of Okhotsk bathymetry], submarine hydrodynamics, ocean storms, and rainfall affect sea water composition and thus submarine performance? Why or Why not?

  Question: If you are a submarine designer, why is sensing and responding to changes in the submarine's hydro chemical environment so important?

• Atmosphere Independent Propulsion: tbd

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Originally Published July 20, 2008; Updated and Republished June 12, 2009:

Holland VI launched on May 17, 1897 and was delivered to the United States Navy on April 4, 1900. The Navy retroactively designated it SS 1.

Later, Issac Rice merged the Holland Company, Electro-Dynamic Company, and Electric Launch Company to form today's Electric Boat Company, a division of the General Dynamics Corporation.

Res:

• UPDATED 06/12/2009 Portsmouth Nautical Archeological Society, June 2009 Holland V Dive.