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Virginia Class Submarine - Defense Authorization FY10
12/18/09
Originally Published May 08, 2009; Last Updated July 24, 2010, 2009; Last Republished December 18, 2009:
The president has submitted his budget for FY 2010. The Navy Shipbuilding and Conversion portion of the FY 2010 Defense budget proposes $2,107,040,000 for one Virginia-class submarine2 (VCS) and $1,395,548,000 for advance procurement. |  |
A VCS without crew or weapons currently costs a mind-boggling and eye-popping $2.8 billion dollars1. The current average cost of a VCS is significantly more than $2.8 billion (assuming the $6.2 billion non-recurring design costs are not reflected in the $2.8 billion).
Even if the Navy and contractors meet the often parroted $2 billion1 target the average cost for delivering a VCS will likely not drop below $3 billion dollars and will most likely rise (see On FPI Contracting And The Virginia Class Submarine).
- Manufacturers: General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman
- Displacement (tons): submerged - 7,800; surface - 7,300 (est)
- Length: (feet/meter): 377/114.9
- Beam: (feet/meter): 34/10.3
- Speed (knots/mph/kph): submerged – 34/39.1/62.9; surface – 14/16.1/25.9
- Propulsion: single shaft, pump-jet, 44,000 shp
- Power plant: S9G, advanced breeder
- Dive Depth (feet/meter): 1,600/487.6
- Torpedo Tubes: 4; 21”
- Armaments: Mark 48 Torpedo (heavy); Block IV Cruise and Harpoon Missile; Mark 67 SLMM; littoral mining
- Standard Crew Complement: 134 men (no women, yet)
Web:
UPDATED 07/24/2010 CNet, Inside the world's most advanced submarine.
Our Navy is opening up, a bit, showing off its three billion dollar attack submarine platform—a very stealthy, manned, and expensive network node deploying sophisticated sensors, Special Forces, and weapons.
The question immediately arises whether an autonomous system is better able to provide equivalent or better functionality minus at least a couple of billion dollars?
A cheap but sophisticated autonomous node that inputs-outputs to the quieter SSGNs, as well as jointly or alone controls its weapons, if or when required.
UPDATED 12/18/2009 Senate Roll Call Vote 381, Senate Ends Debate on Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010 (H.R. 3326).
Senate in a 1:00 A.M. vote ends debate—nothing different from October 2009 for the Virginia-class submarine.
UPDATED 10/08/2009 Senate Roll Call Vote 315, Senate Approves Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010. A whopping $640,431,852,000 in new total budget obligational authority.
The approved Senate Report 111-074 and House Report 111-230 now move to conference for reconciliation, approval, and our president's signature (see also H.R. 2647 and Conference Report 111-288
[link not yet available]).Both reports include $1,964,317,000 for one VCS (add FY2009 advanced procurement appropriation to get total submarine appropriation for one VCS).
Unfortunately, Report 111-074 includes $1,959,725,000 for advance VCS procurement, which appears to support a production rate of two VCS per year.
See also House Report 111-166:
"The committee believes that two Virginia class submarines is the minimum that should be funded annually...The request also contains advance procurement for long-lead material and equipment for seven additional vessels, including two Virginia class submarines, for which full funding is expected in fiscal year 2011."--House Report 111-166--
The VCS production rate maybe be related to China's aggressive, albeit technologically lagging, submarine construction program? It will be most unfortunate for America, China and the world if our nations cannot figure out how to avoid repeating a Cold War style armaments race. As both China and America suspect (but are yet to be convinced) neither nation will discover security in such a race. Just a lot more insecurity, wasted resources and damage to our world!
Unfortunately, development and deployment of competing cooperative models has been slow to evolve and gain dominance. It appears likely several more cycles through the armament race model may be required before nations become convinced competing cooperative models should dominate?
The good news is that the major powers appear convinced that some armaments must be excluded from the next armament race cycle. But, like all cartel members extending and exploiting a monopoly each will find it very difficult or impossible to prevent "others" from cheating.
When such a method is “discovered” it will be called cooperative—much work remains to be done. In the meantime we’ll endure another armament cycle at progressively prohibitive costs.
Such appears to be the destiny of a "thinking species"!
UPDATED 09/23/2009 Bloomberg, Littoral Ships, Other Weapons Cut in New U.S. Navy 5-Year Plan .
The article is reporting that the Navy Five Year Plan (2015) is proposing a reduction of one VCS. Unfortunately the Navy has not, yet publicly released its latest proposed Five Year Plan.
So the Navy is now planning to buy 12 VCS as of FY2010 (4 Block I; 6 Block II; 2 Block III) and 9 VCS as of FY2015 (6 Block III; 3 Block IV).
Well it's a start and saves a cool $2.8 billion (our Navy says $2 billion) plus operational, maintenance, upgrade, and retrofit cost for 30-40 years!
How about canceling the eight VCS beyond 2015 (6 Block IV and 2 Block V)?
Alternatively snap in a small strategic missile section and call all eight the Ohio-class Sea Based Strategic Deterrent replacement10.
UPDATED 08/04/2009 Worldcat, Submarine: Hidden Hunter.
Those wanting to learn more about life on board a VCS might want to also checkout Submarine: Hidden Hunter, a Discovery Channel 50 minute DVD using the VCS submarine Texas—there is a seven minute preview on the Discovery Channel website (the DVD is also available).
Swedish Submariner9Northrop Grumman (a co-manufacturer of the VCS) has just released two photos of the “move-in meal” aboard the VCS New Mexico—submarine food is good, at least at the beginning of a patrol; at the end, well, let’s just say it might not look quite as tasty as the meal pictured in the photos.
UPDATED 08/03/2009 Projo, Providence Journal, Rhode Island News, The anatomy of a fast-attack nuclear sub.
An article (embedded in multi-media package) about some of the top-level workflows (as opposed to anatomy) for the VCS, including some manpower numbers applicable to Rhode Island.
There is no question that the VCS is technologically a modern marvel, but that alone does not make the case for ramping up VCS production from the current one VCS per year to two.
It is also useful to point out that the skill sets for the manufacture of the VCS (and other major weapons systems) are transferable to other sectors of our economy.
UPDATED 06/27/2009 NavyMil, Virginia-class Submarines Receive the Highest Ranking of Operational Test Agency.
The Navy is reporting that Operational Test and Evaluation Force (COMOPTEVFOR or COTF) have submitted its final report for the Virginia-class submarine (VCS) to the CNO.
The Navy article states that COMOPTEVFOR has judged the VCS "operationally effective" and "operationally suitable" but does not provide the report. Hopefully the CNO will release the COMOPTEVFOR report soon.
It's a little curious that the VCS is currently getting an entire new front-end. The new front-end includes an entirely different sonar from the sonar on the VCS used by COMOPTEVFOR to judged the VCS "operationally effective" and "operationally suitable".
It seems useful to test, evaluate, and certify the submarine and submarine sonar that will be produced—not a prototype submarine with a completely different sonar.
Also, it will be interesting to read and understand how COMOPTEVFOR handled the testing of the VCS shock requirements. This is extremely important as so much of the VCS mission critical hardware is COTS.
UPDATED 06/12/2009 The Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee (SEFS) Markup H.R. 2647, FY10. The markup includes $2.8 billion for one VCS.
Unsurprisingly, the subcommittee chairman and co-chair of the shipbuilding caucus, Gene Taylor expressed support for Navy's "vision" (dream?) of building 48 VCS.
“This mark clearly sets the subcommittees vision for the future, that vision is a Fleet of at least 313 ships. That Fleet will have a high/low mix with our aircraft carriers and nuclear cruisers at the high end, over 90 DDG 51 destroyers, at least 48 Virginia class submarines, and at least 55 Littoral Combat Ships."--Representative Gene Taylor (MS-D)--
Unfortunately congressman Taylor did not inform us why our Navy needs 48 VCS or what it plans on doing with them beyond incurring and accumulating enormous purchase, operation, maintenance, and disposal costs (hopefully others are challenging the costs and need for purchasing, operating, maintaining, and disposing of 11 carrier battle groups)?!
It appears the Navy and its patrons have not yet received the change memo?!
UPDATED 06/06/2009 CNO testifies before House Appropriation Subcommittee for Defense on June 02, 2009.
The CNO repeats his Armed Service testimony before the defense subcommittee—this time with the new Secretary of Navy in tow.
It's amazing how little justification is required by congress before funding these exorbitant weapon systems—we're forward deployed worldwide, our core capability is sea control, or as long as clubs exist we must have the biggest one is not justification!
UPDATED 05/28/2009 Naval Institute Proceedings Magazine, Fear and Loathing in the Post-Naval Era. Interesting article by prolific WWII naval writer Barrett Tillman in Naval Institute Proceedings:
"Since the United States has not fought a real naval battle since World War II, justifying the high cost of a large Fleet of warships and aircraft is a tall order...Why do we have such a big Navy when we hardly ever use it?...What do we get for the hundreds of billions of dollars we pay for having a Navy and Marine Corps?...The question for naval professionals and their supporters therefore becomes: How do we justify a large blue-water Navy that has not fought a war at sea in three generations?"--Barrett Tillman--
Our exorbitantly priced VCS submarines are basically Cold War platforms in search of a 21st century mission, according to Tillman.
- UPDATED 05/26/2009 Thomas, Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. President signed the legislation on May 22, 2009.
UPDATED 05/18/2009 Joint Chiefs Chairman, Admiral Michael G. Mullen testifies before Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) on May 14, 2009.
Admiral Mullen confirmed the CNO's HASC8 testimony that the FY 2010 purchases one VCS. Although the admiral did not specify whether is was the 11th or 12th or explicitly refer to it as a VCS:
"I fully support not only the President’s fiscal year 2010 budget submission for this department, but more specifically, the manner in which Secretary Gates developed it...It fully funds the Joint Strike Fighter and F–18 Superhornet programs, buys another Arleigh Burke destroyer, a nuclear submarine, and a third DDG–1000. ..."--Admiral Mullen before SASC on May 14, 2009--
(Archived Webcast Gates and Mullen, May 14, 2009)
UPDATED 05/15/2009 CNO testifies before House Armed Services Subcommittee (HASC) on May 14, 2009.
"...Specifically, our FY 2010 budget funds eight ships: the 12th Virginia class submarine3, three Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), two T-AKE Dry Cargo and Ammunition Ships, a second Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) for the Navy, and an advanced Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer...The VIRGINIA Class submarine is a multi-mission submarine that dominates in the littorals and open oceans. Now in its 10th year of construction, the VIRGINIA program is demonstrating that this critical undersea capability can be delivered affordably and on time. We have aggressively reduced construction costs of the VIRGINIA Class to $2 billion per submarine, as measured in FY 2005 dollars, through construction performance improvements, redesign for affordability, and a multi-year procurement contract, which provides an assured build rate for shipyards4 and vendors and offers incentives for cost5, schedule6, and capital expenditure for facility improvements7. Not only are these submarines coming in within budget and ahead of schedule, their performance is exceeding expectations and continues to improve with each ship delivered. I consider Virginia Class cost reduction efforts a model for all our ships, submarines, and aircraft."--CNO Admiral Gary Roughead, May 14, 2009--
Hearings are ongoing and others have testified before and after the CNO...more later.
-----notes-----
1. The FY 2009 (see Virginia Class Submarine - Defense Authorization FY09) budget paid the advance procurement for the FY 2010 VCS. To get the total cost of $2.8 billion you add last year advance procurement to the above $2.1 billion dollars.
After purchasing the VCS for $2.8 billion our Navy's ownership costs include: crew costs; weapons costs; operating costs; maintenance costs; upgrade costs; retrofit costs;—for thirty too forty years! Then at the end of 30-40 years the Navy must pay for: defueling and storage of the submarine's radioactive reactor compartment, forever; reprocessing spent fuel rods; and scrapping the submarine (there is a very small offset for the scrap value of the non-radioactive HY-100 steel and miscellaneous submarine metal).
The Navy and contractors perpetually and understandably refer to their unrealized goal of reducing the cost of a VCS too $2 billion dollars and never talk about the staggering total cost of owning and operating one VCS, much less 11, 21, 36, 50 or more!
However, without public release of more supporting data it's virtually impossible to accurately evaluate the assumptions and conditions corresponding with the often parroted $2 billion dollar goal, notwithstanding issuance of the Block III FPI contract (see On FPI Contracting And The Virginia Class Submarine). Much less the total cost of ownership for a single VCS—our Navy must make public these data.
2. UPDATED 05/08/2009 Those using a $4.182B figure are likely referring to a DoD document Program Acquisition Costs by Weapon System, DoD FY 2010 Budget Request Summary Justification, May 2009.
Additionally, some may be relying on non-public personal discussions with Connecticut's Second Congressional District Representative Joe Courtney (and others), understandably a strong proponent for the costly two contractors, two VCS per year production rate configuration.
3. It's unclear what funds the 11th VCS, the first of the Block III FPI VCS if 2010 only funds the 12th VCS? The CNO enumerates eight ships, including one VCS, the 12th in the submarine class.
4. The CNO is obliquely tying the unrealized $2 billion dollar price target to a two contractor, two VCS per year production rate. The follow-up question is what happens to the unrealized $2 billion dollar target price if there is one contractor and one submarine per year production rate?
5. The CNO is referring to the Fixed Price Incentive contract which awards additional profit for meeting negotiated incentives—the awards are significant, particularly if they are "front-loaded" (see also On FPI Contracting And The Virginia Class Submarine).
6. The CNO is obliquely referring to another significant assumption tied to the unrealized $2 billion dollar price target—that the schedule will be compressed in order to eliminate the overhead (G&A) and level-of-effort costs, primarily program management.
7. It's unclear whether the CNO is referring to direct reimbursement of the contractor for capital expenditures on capital improvements or indirectly via incremental profits for capital expenditures via the cost of capital calculations or both direct and indirect reimbursement for capital expenditures on capital improvements?
This is not trivial as capital expenditures for submarine programs are enormous—double enormous when you plan on reimbursing two contractors for two sets of identical capital improvements so you can produce two submarines per year.
8. An online post by the Norwich Bulletin, Pentagon praises effectiveness of 'extraordinary' subs dated May 17, 2009 indicates that the CNO appeared before the HASC, Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee on May 14, 2009—the Hangar has been unable to locate that testimony, if it exists.
The post also quotes Representative Courtney as saying "he [Courtney] and the Pentagon are on the same page regarding the submarine funding in Fiscal Year 2010"—a page that both the CNO and Joint Chief chairman think includes one VCS.
Evidently, Representative Courtney believes that the page includes different funding with respect to the VCS (not SBSD funding, $495 million)—hopefully he will make public the basis of this belief.
9. The submariner is crewing on a non-nuclear submarine using a sterling engine running liquid oxygen.
Women have crewed Swedish submarines since 1988 according to the Swedish officer interviewed during the program.
Some have raised pregnancy concerns as justification for continuing to impede women's entry into America's nuclear submarine force.
Certainly pregnancy requires more awareness of submariners’ interpersonal behavior, radiation impact on fetal development, and submarine operations. Increase awareness is not synonymous with insurmountable impediment preventing our women from serving as proud, proficient, and professional submariners.
Those speaking Swedish will discover this submariner is perfectly aware that she's female and perfectly unaware that her gender should hinder her performance as a submariner. Swedish women are simply not taught that their gender is an impediment.
UPDATED 08/13/2009 Here is Vanity Fair quoting our new Secretary of Navy, Ray Mabus on why women are not allowed to serve their country on submarines.
His meaningless "weasel worded" response you might cause you to think he was asked why the Virginia-class submarine overran its initial price tag by $2 billion dollars!):
Q: Women aren’t allowed on submarines, but I’ve heard conflicting reasons why. Are the rumors true—that it’s so they won’t get pregnant? [Pregnant women aren’t allowed in combat.]
A: I’ll be absolutely truthful—I know submarines are the one place where women don’t serve, but after this conversation I’ll find out why.
Mabus’s secretary followed up with the official response: “The policy of not assigning women to submarines remains unchanged today because of the platform’s very unique space limitations, equipment density, design constraints and extended mission requirements. The policy is reviewed periodically—while there is no formal study per se, it is something we're taking a look at.”
It's time to stop "looking at it" and start assigning women to serve aboard our submarines.
10. As nations move toward nuclear zero these submarines can be converted to tactical SSGNs—similar to today’s four converted SSBNs to SSGNs.
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