Misblog

Originally Published August 28, 2009; Last Updated March 07, 2010; Last Republished March 07, 2010:

"In a mature fast-reactor economy, however, there will be no legitimate reason either to enrich uranium or to use the PUREX-type process that extracts pure, weapons-usable plutonium. Any such effort would be prima facie evidence of an attempt to build nuclear weapons, making it easy to monitor and stop would-be proliferators."--George Stanford--

Res:

• UPDATED 12/29/2009 CFR, Iran: Time for a New Approach. A task force report.
• UPDATED 12/29/2009 USIP, Iraq Study Group. Section 3. Dealing with Iran and Syria.
• UPDATED 12/29/2009 Chatham House, Iran: Breaking the Nuclear Deadlock.
• UPDATED 09/02/2009 NTI, An Iran Nuclear Chronology Through June 2009 IAEA. Based on a collection of media reports.
• Scribd, IAEA August 28, 2009 Report. (see below for HTML version)

Blog:

• UPDATED 12/18/2009 FAS, Response to Critiques Against Fordow Analysis.

Web:

• UPDATED 03/07/2010 Reuters, China says Iran sanctions no cure.

  It seems pretty clear that all nations agree that Iran sanctions are not a cure. Rather an incremental process whereby every nation decides notwithstanding current interests they will begin disentangling and disengaging from a high probability proliferator.

  It seem beneficial that disentanglement and disengagement does not happen in unison, but rather contiguously and continuously across time and nations. Some nations will disentangle and disengage immediately others will require considerably more time to unwind, substitute, and pursue alternatives.

  A nation with more entanglements and engagements has a greater opportunity and incentive to influence a high probability proliferator, while simultaneously participating in the disentanglement or disengagement.

  But refusing to participate or impeding disentanglement and disengagement because sanctions are not a cure is nothing less than facilitating a high probability proliferation.

  The wonderful Iranian people are pursuing a cure—some are being water and chemically cannoned by riot vehicles provided courtesy of China. (see NYT, U.S. Enriches Companies Defying Its Policy on Iran for our support to Iran nothwithstanding our calls for sanctions.

• UPDATED 01/17/2010 UPI, China not to back new sanctions.

  Simply referring to "room for negotiation" without explanation or active participation risks the appearance of obstructing nonproliferation efforts.

• UPDATED 01/14/2010 NTI, Iran Denies Suspending Uranium Enrichment.

• UPDATED 01/12/2010 VOA, US Defense Spy Chief: Iran Undecided on Nuclear Bomb.

  "The fact is, Iran is not dealing straight up,...So they [Iranian leaders] can say whatever they would like. I'm [Lieutenant General Ronald Burgess] an intelligence professional. My job is to verify. And so we continually work on trying to verify what it is the Iranians say. But they are engaged in use of words that is not moving this in a positive direction."

  Fortunately for the general Iran is a leaky sieve—unfortunately, Iran’s current leadership are operating with wacky religious beliefs.

  The general is not just trying to separate and verify data (signal) from wacky religious beliefs, dogma, and rhetoric (noise), but their unique brand of wacky religious beliefs, dogma, and rhetoric (noise)—it's very difficult, even for an experienced professional to get at the signal.

• UPDATED 01/06/2010 NYT, Iran Shielding Its Nuclear Efforts in Maze of Tunnels.

• UPDATED 01/05/2010 LAT, China dismisses more UN sanctions talk during its Security Council presidency in January.

  China risks its credibility and projecting a perception that it's a facilitator of nuclear proliferation instead of impeder.

  Diplomacy must proceed in combination with other continuous cooperative actions related to increasing the probability of nonproliferation and decreasing the probability of proliferation.

  China must explain its assertion that now is not the time for further action in parallel with diplomacy.

• UPDATED 01/02/2010 NYT, U.S. Sees an Opportunity to Press Iran on Nuclear Fuel.

• UPDATED 12/22/2009 Brookings, Sanctioning Iran: If Only It Were So Simple.

  Most do not argue that Iran sanctions are a panacea—most acknowledge the limited usefulness of sanctions—most do not suggest Iran or nuclear proliferation in general are simple matters.

  Nevertheless, a consensus for the combination of: diplomacy; smart application and administration of sanctions; comprehensive inspections; and the application of targeted United Nations authorized force have been shown useful in curbing proliferation.

  Ultimately the Iranian people must be the ones to exchange their authoritarian religious leaders for non-authoritarian secular leaders.

  Leaders who depend on the consensus of the talented Iranian people not on wacky religious dogma and doctrine to govern.

• UPDATED 12/16/2009 Reuters, Iran missile test draws Western condemnation.

  It’s useful to recall that this isn't about Iran, but about how all nations' proliferation efforts will be handled.

  Patient, persistent diplomacy aimed at continuous closing consensus sanctions—who cares if Iran's wacky religious regime test-launch a missile or two or three a day.

  It's useful to be mindful, as Zbigniew Brzezinski recently cautioned, that some are seeking to use Iran's irresponsible non-imminent (remote) generalized threats and harmless schoolyard antics and bullying to justify an unlawful preventative attack (as opposed to lawful preemptive attack).

• UPDATED 11/27/2009 Reuters, IAEA votes to rebuke Iran over nuclear cover-up.

  A mostly symbolic IAEA Board of Governors resolution expressing frustration at Iran's delayed disclosure of the Qom nuclear site—Iran made a belated disclosure of the Qom site after a U.S. disclosure—a move unlikely to increase Iran's credibility or trust by the IAEA or community of nations.

  In an encouraging sign of unity against nuclear proliferation all five major Security Council nations voted in favor of the resolution that requires Iran to cease construction activity of the Qom site, among other items:
  

  1. Urges Iran to comply fully and without delay with its obligations under the above mentioned resolutions of the Security Council, and to meet the requirements of the Board of Governors, including by suspending immediately construction at Qom;
  2. Urges Iran to engage with the Agency on the resolution of all outstanding issues concerning Iran’s nuclear programme and, to this end, to cooperate fully with the IAEA by providing such access and information that the Agency requests to resolve these issues;
  3. Urges Iran to comply fully and without qualification with its safeguards obligations, to apply the modified Code 3.1 and implement and ratify promptly the Additional Protocol;
  4. Urges Iran specifically to provide the Agency with the requested clarifications regarding the purpose of the enrichment plant at Qom and the chronology of its design and construction;
  5. Calls on Iran to confirm, as requested by the Agency, that Iran has not taken a decision to construct, or authorize construction of, any other nuclear facility which has as yet not been declared to the Agency;
  6. Requests the Director General to continue his efforts to implement the Safeguards Agreement in Iran, resolve the outstanding issues which give rise to concerns, and which need to be clarified to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme, and to implement the relevant provisions of UNSC resolutions;

• UPDATED 11/19/2009 UK Guardian, Barack Obama: Iran faces fresh nuclear sanctions within weeks

  "Iran's foreign minster [sic Foreign Minister], Manouchehr Mottaki, speaking in Manila, dismissed talk of further sanctions. "Sanction was the literature of the 60s and 70s,' he said. 'I think they are wise enough not to repeat failed experiences.'"--UK Guardian--

  Iran's foreign minister is absolutely incorrect with respect to sanctions relating to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or potential proliferation of WMD or a prior opaque pattern with respect to potential proliferation of WMD.

  The community of nations must continue their impressive work to ensure all state sanctions relating to production of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or potential proliferation of WMD or a prior opaque pattern with respect to potential proliferation of WMD continually escalate from trivial to total state isolation until confident conforming compliance with all IAEA guidance is demonstrated by the offending state.

• UPDATED 11/16/2009 Reuters, Secrecy raises fears of more Iran atom sites: IAEA and IAEA, Latest IAEA Safeguards Reports Sent to IAEA Board.

  Download the November 16, 2009 IAEA report on Iran from ISIS (43K pdf) or ACA (43K pdf).

• UPDATED 10/22/2009 Haaretz, Iran, Israel attend secret nuclear meet in Cairo.
• UPDATED 10/04/2009 NYT, Iran Agrees to Allow Inspectors on Oct. 25.
• UPDATED 10/04/2009 NYT, Report Says Iran Has Data to Make a Nuclear Bomb.

• UPDATED 10/02/2009 NYT, Iranian Opposition Leader Warns Against Sanctions.

  “This would impose further pain on a nation that has already suffered a great deal by its schizophrenic rulers. We are against any kind of sanctions on people.”--Iran Opposition Leader Mir Hussein Moussavi--

• UPDATED 10/02/2009 NYT, Iran Agrees to Send Enriched Uranium to Russia.

• UPDATED 10/01/2009 Reuters, Iran nuclear talks with U.S. and allies eases tension.

  Reports, if confirmed, that Iran will obtain 20% enriched fuel² from the IAEA, via Russia are good news.

  Iran is apparently amenable to obtaining nuclear fuel from an IAEA fuel bank in lieu of continuing its pursuit of the fuel cycle?

  Hopefully, Israel, Pakistan, and India will be convinced global security requires all nations to rely on a fuel bank.

  The major nuclear powers must continue reducing their uranium and plutonium stockpiles so that within a short period EVERY nation has switched to an IAEA run and controlled fuel bank for ALL its fissile material.

• UPDATED 09/28/2009 NewsHour, Iran Claims Missile Test as Calls for New Sanctions Grow.

• UPDATED 09/26/2009 VOA, Iran to Allow IAEA Inspectors into Nuclear Plant.

  Israel must focus on becoming a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and follow-on Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

  Leave Iran (an NPT signatory) and its nuclear fuel cycle to the United Nations Security Council and IAEA.

  Ditto for Pakistan and India.

• UPDATED 09/25/2009 NYT, U.S. to Accuse Iran of Having Secret Nuclear Fuel Facility.

  Iran has informed the IAEA that it has another previously undisclosed enrichment facility. Repeatedly lying to the world when saying it had cooperated fully with the IAEA. A lie repeated again this week by the putative Iranian president at the United Nations.

  Iran's has decided to come clean after it learned we've been monitoring construction of the secret Iranian facility for years. Better late than never.

  There is some beauty in Iran's religious regime¹ being hoisting on its own petard.

• UPDATED 09/23/2009 Reuters, Six powers demand "serious response" from Iran.

  In an encouraging and remarkable display of unity the major nuclear powers and permanent security council members have encouraged Iran to transparently cooperate with IAEA or face additional consequences.

• UPDATED 09/15/2009 Reuters, Iran sees better cooperation with nuclear watchdog.

• UPDATED 09/11/2009 NYT, U.S. to Accept Iran’s Proposal to Hold Talks.

  Kudos to the president for talking to Iran in person and anywhere and anytime, and on any topic of national importance to them or us.

• UPDATED 09/10/2009 ProPublica, Exclusive: Read Iran’s New Proposal for Nuclear Talks.

  Article includes a copy of Iran's proposal.

  UPDATED 09/11/2009 U.S. negotiators find little in the proposal to form a basis for negotiation.

  Russia has unfortunately indicated its opposition to additional sanctions should Iran continue to be unresponsive to all IAEA requests. Perhaps it can point to hooks upon which to hang negotiations? (see CSM, Iran nuclear proposal rejected as Russia dismisses sanctions and Xinhua, Iran Nuclear Crisis)

  Surely Russia's stature will significantly diminish if it supports national intransigence to legitimate IAEA requests.

• UPDATED 09/05/2009 Reuters, Iran dismisses bomb studies intelligence as forged.

  On matters of fissile material and nuclear proliferation nothing but total transparency is acceptable for all nations (i.e. total and unimpeded access to all facilities, scientists, documents, stockpiles, hardware etcetera).

  All nations' ability to participate in any international system must be inversely related to that nation's opaqueness on matters of fissile material and nuclear proliferation. All nations' ability to participate in any international system must be highly correlated with that nation's total transparency on matters of fissile material and nuclear proliferation.

  The non-transparent nation's disconnect from all international systems must be immediate, objective, progressive, proportional, public, consistent, and reversible.

• 9/02/2009 Reuters, Iran nuclear "threat" hyped: IAEA's ElBaradei.

  International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) out-going Director General Mohamed ElBaradei tells the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists that in many ways the Iran nuclear threat has been hyped. (see below for latest IAEA report on Iran's efforts to master the nuclear fuel cycle.)

• UPDATED 09/02/2009 BAS, Inside the Iranian nuclear program
• UPDATED 08/29/2009 Reuters, U.N. nuclear watchdog denies hiding Iran information.

Follow up:

1. On 5 June 2009, the Director General reported to the Board of Governors on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) (GOV/2009/35). This report covers relevant developments since that date.
2. On 12 August 2009, Iran was feeding UF6 into Unit A24, and ten cascades of Unit A26, at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz.1 On that day, the eight other cascades of Unit A26 were under vacuum. Iran has continued with the installation of cascades at Unit A28; fourteen cascades have been installed and the installation of another cascade is continuing.2 All machines installed to date are IR-1 centrifuges. Installation work at Units A25 and A27 is also continuing.
3. Iran has estimated that, between 18 November 2008 and 31 July 2009, 7942 kg of UF6 was fed into the cascades and a total of 669 kg of low enriched UF6 was produced.3 The nuclear material at FEP (including the feed, product and tails), as well as all installed cascades and the feed and withdrawal stations, are subject to Agency containment and surveillance.
4. As reported earlier, the Agency had informed Iran that, given the increasing number of cascades being installed at FEP and the increased rate of production of low enriched uranium at the facility, improvements to the containment and surveillance measures at FEP were needed for the Agency to continue to fully meet its safeguards objectives for the facility (GOV/2009/35, para. 3). In the course of a series of meetings, Iran and the Agency agreed on the improvements, which were put in place on 12 August 2009. The next physical inventory verification (PIV) at FEP is planned for November 2009. At that time, the Agency will be able to verify the inventory of all nuclear material at the facility and evaluate the nuclear material balance after the cold traps have been cleaned out.
5. Iran and the Agency have also agreed on improvements regarding the provision of accounting and operating records, and on the requirements for timely access for unannounced inspections (GOV/2009/35, para. 5).
6. Between 24 May 2009 and 13 August 2009, a total of approximately 37 kg of UF6 was fed into a 10-machine IR-4 cascade, a 10-machine IR-2m cascade and single IR-1, IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuges at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP). The nuclear material at PFEP, as well as the cascade area and the feed and withdrawal stations, remain under Agency containment and surveillance.
7. The results of the environmental samples taken at FEP and PFEP indicate that both plants have been operating as declared (i.e. less than 5.0% U-235 enrichment).5 Since the last report, the Agency has successfully conducted three unannounced inspections. A total of 29 unannounced inspections have been conducted at FEP since March 2007.
8. The Agency has continued to monitor the use and construction of hot cells at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility. There have been no indications of ongoing reprocessing related activities at those facilities. While Iran has stated that there have been no reprocessing related R&D activities in Iran, the Agency can confirm this only with respect to these two facilities, as the measures of the Additional Protocol are not available.
9. On 19 June 2009, the Agency requested Iran to update the Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) for the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) and the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) to reflect the design features of the fuel assembly verified by the Agency during its May 2009 inspection at FMP (GOV/2009/35, para. 9). Under cover of a letter dated 21 August 2009, Iran submitted an updated DIQ for FMP, which the Agency is now reviewing.
10. On 11 August 2009, the Agency conducted both a PIV and design information verification (DIV) at FMP, at which time it was noted that the final quality control equipment had been installed, and the fuel assembly referred to above was undergoing quality control testing. Assessment of the results of the PIV is still pending.
11. On 17 August 2009, Iran, following repeated requests by the Agency, provided the Agency with access to the IR-40 reactor at Arak, at which time the Agency was able to carry out a DIV. The Agency verified that the construction of the facility was ongoing. In particular, the Agency noted that no reactor vessel was yet present. The operator stated that the reactor vessel was still being manufactured, and that it would be installed in 2011. Iran also stated that no hot cell windows or manipulators could be procured from foreign sources and that it was considering producing them domestically. Iran estimated that the civil construction work was about 95% completed and that the plant itself was about 63% completed. The facility at its current stage of construction conforms to the design information provided by Iran as of 24 January 2007. However, Iran still needs to provide updated and more detailed design information, in particular about the nuclear fuel characteristics, fuel handling and transfer equipment and the nuclear material accountancy and control system. The Agency has continued using satellite imagery to monitor the status of the Heavy Water Production Plant, which seems not to have been operating since the last report.
12. The Agency finalized its assessment of the results of the PIV carried out at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) in March 2009 (GOV/2009/35, para. 11), and has concluded that the inventory of nuclear material at UCF as declared by Iran is consistent with those results, within the measurement uncertainties normally associated with conversion plants of similar throughput. Between 8 March 2009 and 10 August 2009, approximately 11 tonnes of uranium in the form of UF6 was produced at UCF. This brings the total amount of uranium in the form of UF6 produced at UCF since March 2004 to approximately 366 tonnes, some of which was transferred to FEP and PFEP, and all of which remains under Agency containment and surveillance. Between March 2009 and 10 August 2009, 159 samples of ammonium diuranate, containing about 2 kg of uranium, were received at UCF from the Bandar Abbas Uranium Production Plant.
13. On 21 July 2009 and 10 August 2009, the Agency conducted design information verification at UCF. The Agency was able to confirm that the facility conforms to the design information provided by Iran.
14. Iran has not yet resumed the implementation of the revised Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part on the early provision of design information (GOV/2008/59, para. 9; GOV/2007/22, paras 12–14). Iran is the only State with significant nuclear activities which has a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force but is not implementing the provisions of the revised Code 3.1. The absence of such information results in late notification to the Agency of the construction of new facilities and changes to the design of existing facilities.
15. The Agency has not yet received the requested preliminary design information for the nuclear power plant that is to be built in Darkhovin (GOV/2008/38, para. 11).
16. In view of the anticipated loading of fuel into the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (GOV/2009/35, para. 15), now expected to take place in October/November 2009, the Agency installed a containment and surveillance system at that facility on 22–25 August 2009.
17. In a letter dated 12 July 2009, Iran informed the Agency that it had transferred all nuclear material out of the Uranium Chemical Laboratory at Esfahan and that it did not plan any other nuclear activities in this location and requested the Agency to consider this facility as a decommissioned facility. The Agency has scheduled an inspection to confirm the decommissioned status of this facility.
18. As referred to in the Director General’s previous reports to the Board (most recently in GOV/2009/35, para. 17), there remain a number of outstanding issues which give rise to concerns, and which need to be clarified to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. As indicated in those reports, it is essential that Iran re-engage with the Agency to clarify and bring to a closure questions related to the alleged studies, the circumstances of the acquisition of the uranium metal document, and the procurement and R&D activities of military related institutes and companies that could be nuclear related as well as the production of nuclear related equipment and components by companies belonging to defence industries.

19. It should be noted that, although the Agency has limited means to authenticate independently the documentation that forms the basis of the alleged studies, the information is being critically assessed, in accordance with the Agency’s practices, by corroborating it, inter alia, with other information available to the Agency from other sources and from its own findings. A description of all of the documentation available to the Agency about the alleged studies which the Agency has been authorized to share with Iran and which has been sufficiently vetted by the Agency was provided in the Director General’s report of May 2008 (GOV/2008/15, Annex A). It should be noted, however, that the constraints placed by some Member States on the availability of information to Iran are making it more difficult for the Agency to conduct detailed discussions with Iran on this matter.

    Notwithstanding, as the Director General has repeatedly emphasized, the information contained in that documentation appears to have been derived from multiple sources over different periods of time, appears to be generally consistent, and is sufficiently comprehensive and detailed that it needs to be addressed by Iran with a view to removing the doubts which naturally arise, in light of all of the outstanding issues, about the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.

20. In connection with the outstanding issues, Iran has provided to the Agency: (a) its overall assessment of the documentation related to the alleged studies (GOV/2008/15, Annex A), and (b) partial replies and a document, in response to specific questions presented by the Agency (GOV/2008/15, Annex B). Iran has indicated further that it has information which could shed more light on the nature of the alleged studies, but has not yet provided it to the Agency (GOV/2008/15, para. 23). In the meantime, the Agency has studied the information provided by Iran thus far, but has not yet been given the opportunity by Iran to discuss its findings in detail owing to Iran’s insistence that it had already provided its final responses. In the view of the Agency, however, there are still matters which need to be discussed based on the documents and information provided by Iran itself or which relate to information which the Agency has independently corroborated. Examples of information included in the documentation that Iran has not disputed as being factually accurate7 are provided below.
21. Although Iran has challenged the allegation that it has engaged in nuclear related high explosives testing studies, Iran has told the Agency that it has experimented with the civil application of simultaneously functioning multiple detonators (GOV/2008/15, para. 20), and was asked by the Agency to provide it with information which would prove that such work had been for civil and nonnuclear military purposes (GOV/2008/38, para. 17(c)). Iran has not yet shared that information with the Agency. The Agency would also like to discuss with Iran the possible role that a foreign national with explosives expertise (GOV/2008/38, para. 17(d)), whose visit to Iran has been confirmed by the Agency, played in explosives development work.
22. With respect to the letter with handwritten annotations which was part of the documentation related to the alleged green salt project (GOV/2008/15, Annex A.1, Doc. 2), Iran has confirmed the existence of the underlying letter, has shown the original to the Agency and has provided the Agency with a copy of it. The existence of this original demonstrates a direct link between the relevant documentation and Iran. As already requested of Iran, the Agency needs to see further related correspondence and to have access to the individuals named in the letter.
23. In respect to the alleged missile re-entry vehicle studies, the Agency still wishes to visit the civilian workshops which Iran has indicated to the Agency exist and which are identified in the documentation as having been involved in the production of model prototypes of a new payload chamber for a missile (GOV/2008/38, para. 17(e)). In addition, while asserting that the documentation on the alleged missile re-entry vehicle was forged and fabricated, Iran informed the Agency that it was well known that Iran was working on the Shahab-3 missile. In light of that, the Agency has reiterated the need to hold discussions with Iran on the engineering and modelling studies associated with the re-design of the payload chamber referred to in the alleged studies documentation to exclude the possibility that they were for a nuclear payload.
24. In light of the above, the Agency has repeatedly informed Iran that it does not consider that Iran has adequately addressed the substance of the issues, having focused instead on the style and form of presentation of the written documents relevant to the alleged studies and providing limited answers or simple denials in response to other questions. The Agency has therefore requested Iran to provide more substantive responses and to provide the Agency with the opportunity to have detailed discussions with a view to moving forward on these issues, including granting the Agency access to persons, information and locations identified in the documents in order for the Agency to be able to confirm Iran’s assertion that these documents are false and fabricated. The Agency has reiterated its willingness to discuss modalities that could enable Iran to demonstrate credibly that the activities referred to in the documentation are not nuclear related, as Iran asserts, while protecting sensitive information related to its conventional military activities.
25. For the Agency to be in a position to progress in its verification of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, it is essential that Iran take the necessary steps to enable the Agency to clarify and bring to a closure the outstanding issues and implement its Additional Protocol.
26. The Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. Iran has cooperated with the Agency in improving safeguards measures at FEP and in providing the Agency with access to the IR-40 reactor for purposes of design information verification. Iran has not, however, implemented the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1, on the early provision of design information.
27. Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities or its work on heavy water related projects as required by the Security Council.
28. Contrary to the requests of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has neither implemented the Additional Protocol nor cooperated with the Agency in connection with the remaining issues of concern which need to be clarified to exclude the possibility of military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. Regrettably, the Agency has not been able to engage Iran in any substantive discussions about these outstanding issues for over a year. The Agency believes that it has provided Iran with sufficient access to documentation in its possession to enable Iran to respond substantively to the questions raised by the Agency. However, the Director General urges Member States which have provided documentation to the Agency to work out new modalities with the Agency so that it could share further documentation with Iran, as appropriate, since the Agency’s inability to do so is rendering it difficult for the Agency to progress further in its verification process.
29. It is critical for Iran to implement the Additional Protocol and clarify the outstanding issues in order for the Agency to be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.
30. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

The above items from the report do not include Heading or Footnotes—a pdf of the report can be viewed or downloaded at Scribd (see below above link).

-----notes-----

1. Religious regimes like nuclear weapons have out lived their usefulness.

2. It appears Iran is requesting fuel based on definitional criteria as opposed to technical.

Fuel less than 20% is considered low enriched uranium (LEU).